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1Abstract
From the moment Reinhold Niebuhr heard of the events at Pearl Harbor on 
December 7, 1941, he immediately began imagining American involvement in 
the peace that would follow Allied victory over the Axis powers. Arguably the 
most prominent Protestant theologian in the twentieth century, Niebuhr devel-
oped an intriguing view of the international system in the 1940s. Niebuhr be-
lieved it was America’s responsibility to champion a world order or community 
that would defend and promote justice in the face of tyranny. For justice to exist, 
order was necessary and democracy was the best way to promote world order, 
but not the only way. He also realized that “power” in the international system 
also aff ected global order. To him, the world could not solve global problems 
through an ideal system of international law, nor did he think that the possibili-
ty of world organization was purely a question of the manipulation of power. By 
understanding that a balance between a democratic world order and one based 
upon preponderant power was necessary, Niebuhr identifi ed with both realist 
and idealist. Th e 1940s was the testing ground that would continue to shape and 
aff ect his views of the international system. How did Reinhold Niebuhr believe 
the world could make the transition from war to peace in the 1940s? Th is piv-
otal decade for the United States in the twentieth century was indeed central to 
Niebuhr’s evolving world view that a global order, balancing the use of or will-
ingness to use power (whether political, economic, or military) with a democrat-
ic based system, would bring about a just peace.
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 orn
“Th e world community, toward which all historical forc-
es seem to be driving us, is mankind’s fi nal possibility and 
impossibility.”1
“We can save man from another holocaust only if our nerves 
are steady and if our moral purpose is matched by strategic 
shrewdness.”2
Reinhold Niebuhr
From the moment Reinhold Niebuhr heard of the events at Pearl 
Harbor, he immediately began imagining American involvement in 
the peace that would follow Allied victory over the Axis powers. Ar-
guably the most prominent Protestant theologian in the twentieth 
century, Niebuhr developed an intriguing view of the international 
system in the 1940s. Niebuhr based his view of international relations 
upon the idea that American responsibility in the world was to cham-
pion a world order or community that would defend and promote 
justice in the face of tyranny. For justice to exist, order was neces-
sary. For Niebuhr, democracy was the best way to promote world or-
der, but not the only way. He also realized that “power” in the interna-
tional system also aff ected global order. Th erefore, the United States 
needed to fi nd a balance between a democratic world order and or-
der based upon preponderant power. He identifi ed with both realists 
and idealists, fi nding a central position between the two schools of 
thought. To him, the world could not solve global problems through 
an ideal system of international law, nor did he think that the possi-
bility of world organization was purely a question of the manipula-
tion of power. Th e 1940s was the testing ground that would continue 
to shape and aff ect his views of the international system. 
Th e relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States, 
both emerging world powers, became Niebuhr’s focus during the 
1940s. As the war continued into the decade, Niebuhr realized that 
the Americans and Russians would emerge from the Second World 
War as the most powerful nations, and that any future world order 
would need the involvement of both to succeed. Yet as the war end-
ed, the relationship between the two powers appeared to be an obsta-
cle to the peace. Niebuhr believed that the two had to come to some 
understanding over the basis of world order. A democratically based 
world order was unlikely with a Stalinist Russia. Although a dicta-
torship, the Americans and their allies had things they could learn 
from the Soviets, which were necessary for a successful world order – 
among their willingness to use power to obtain their goals. In order 
to have peace, Niebuhr said that the democratic powers had to com-
bine the development and use of power with democratic means in or-
der to create a world order that would bring about peace and justice.
What follows is an account of Reinhold Niebuhr’s thoughts 
on human nature and their application to the realm of interna-
tional relations during the 1940s. Many works exist dealing with 
Niebuhr’s life. Among them are Ronald Stone’s Reinhold Niebuhr: 
Prophet to Politicians and Paul Merkley’s Reinhold Niebuhr: A Po-
litical Account. Both authors deal mostly with Niebuhr’s politi-
cal interests and career, and the connection between his political 
view and theology. However, each tends to stress his role in the 
Cold War to the exclusion of World War II. Other scholars such 
as Landon Gilkey, Robin W. Lovin, and Gordon Harland, among 
many others, focus on Niebuhr’s theology without eff ectively fi t-
ting his thought into a broader historical context. Th ree books in 
particular, are more successful in combining Niebuhr’s political 
and religious life. Th e fi rst is an edited work by Charles W. Keg-
ley and Robert W. Bretall, Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, 
and Political Thought. Kegley and Bretall’s collection is indispens-
able, as is Richard Wightman Fox’s Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography 
and Henry B. Clark’s Serenity, Courage, and Wisdom: The Endur-
ing Legacy of Reinhold Niebuhr. All three works give substantial 
insight into the connections between Niebuhr’s theology and pol-
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itics. What is missing in these works is a focused study of Rein-
hold Niebuhr’s thoughts on world order or world community in 
the 1940s. How did Reinhold Niebuhr believe the world could 
make the transition from war to peace in the 1940s? Th is pivot-
al decade for the United States in the twentieth century was in-
deed central to Niebuhr’s evolving world view that a global order, 
balancing power (whether political, economic, or military) with a 
democratic based system, would bring about a just peace.3 
To truly understand Niebuhr’s positions, a brief background is 
necessary. His early childhood, adolescence, and adulthood devel-
oped his thoughts into the 1940s. Among the most infl uential as-
pects in his life were his religious background, intellectual develop-
ment at Yale Divinity School and Union Th eological Seminary, and 
his political activity in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Born in 1892, Reinhold Niebuhr was the son of Gustav Niebuhr, 
a German immigrant and pastor of the German Evangelical Church 
in Webster, Missouri. Reinhold was not the eldest child, but he was 
certainly the favorite son. Gustav often invited Reinhold to share in 
his intellectual life and follow in his footsteps. In imitating his father, 
he enrolled in Eden Th eological seminary to become a pastor in the 
German Evangelical Church. Along with this weighty expectation, 
his father began to see Reinhold as the future head of the household 
– the one to look after his mother and sister should his father pass 
away. Gustav was both liberal and evangelical in his faith, adhering 
to the Social Gospel. He was unconcerned with doctrinal precision, 
and believed that not everything in the Bible was literally true. Rein-
hold strove to imitate his father in these respects. 4
Although Reinhold wished to become more like his father, the 
younger Niebuhr struggled with his own identity as a German-
American. He spoke both German and English, but strove to make 
himself more American – so he decided to go to Yale Divinity School, 
hoping to become a pastor like his father, but also looking for an ex-
perience that would help him assimilate into American culture.
Because his father had put much expectation upon Reinhold to 
succeed, Niebuhr emerged into manhood with a strict sense of duty, 
honor, responsibility, and commitment to hard work. Th e qualities 
Gustav instilled in Reinhold manifested themselves while Rein-
hold attended Yale Divinity School from 1913–1915. At Yale he 
began to both emulate his father intellectually as well as attempt-
ing to become more American rather than German American. It 
was at Yale that Reinhold decided to master the English language 
and make it his primary language of communication for the rest of 
his life. During his time at Yale he also began his fi rst attempts at 
writing for national periodicals. In 1913, Gustav passed away and 
Reinhold came to see his own life as a completion of his father’s. 
As he continued his education, he immersed himself in the prevail-
ing currents of American intellectual thought, as well as continu-
ing to adhere to his father’s liberal and progressive ideas.5 
 Upon leaving Yale, Niebuhr accepted a pastorate at Bethel Evan-
gelical Church in Detroit in 1915. Because his messages challenged 
his parishioners to actively think about their faith, Niebuhr gained al-
most immediate notoriety in American religious circles, and began to 
accumulate abundant experience dealing with political leaders, busi-
ness leaders, labor union offi  cials, and ecclesiastical policymakers. He 
also began to travel throughout the US on lecture tours in connec-
tion with European seminars organized and funded by the wealthy 
Protestant leader, Sherwood Eddy. During these lecture circuits he 
met many infl uential political and religious leaders, and gained the 
patronage of Eddy who would be infl uential in getting him a posi-
tion at Union Th eological Seminary in 1928. Th e period from 1915 
to 1928 in Detroit is marked by an outpouring of articles in both reli-
gious and secular journals. Also during these years, Reinhold involved 
himself in many diff erent organizations and political movements – 
including the Socialist Party – which gave him leadership experience 
and honed his organizational skills. While in Detroit, Niebuhr thus 
broadened his thinking and met many infl uential fi gures.
Although Niebuhr identifi ed himself with many of President 
Woodrow Wilson’s ideals during World War I, a trip to the oc-
cupied Ruhr in 1923 changed his outlook. He became skeptical 
of wars fought for liberal ideals, because of the France’s harsh, re-
venge-like policies in the Ruhr. His trip through the area caused 
him to reject war and embrace pacifi sm. Yet Niebuhr never saw 
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himself as a “good” pacifi st. He always stressed his reservations 
about pacifi sm, even while declaring the illegality of war. He crit-
icized those who were naïve in stressing the use of reasonableness 
and goodwill as strategies in working for peaceful settlement and 
repudiated these as means for establishing world order. He be-
lieved that pacifi sm and pacifi sts were ignorant of the structures 
of international power and the way these worked on a global scale. 
Although he was no longer as committed to the idealists’ means 
and goals, he still believed humankind should strive for them even 
though they were unrealistic.6
Until the 1930s, Niebuhr continued to hold on to a slipping ad-
herence to Social Gospel idealism and socialism, but never com-
pletely abandoned either. While at the Union Th eological Seminary 
in the late 1920s and 1930s as a Professor in Applied Christianity, 
his thoughts on human nature and world view fl ourished. As with 
his views on pacifi sm, his adherence to Social Gospel idealism and 
socialism also began to change. As he had chastised the pacifi sts, 
Niebuhr argued that the goals of these liberal movements were uto-
pian, naïve, and overly idealistic. Just as he was never a “good” pac-
ifi st, he was never a “good” Social Gospel idealist or socialist. After 
witnessing labor disputes while living in Detroit, Niebuhr increas-
ingly saw that humans would not always act selfl essly or morally. 
People would act selfi shly and the kingdom of God or utopia could 
not be created in this world, yet at the same time he knew that there 
was goodness in the human race, and believed that humans, although 
immoral at times, should strive to act morally in the face of immo-
rality. Humans should strive to make the world better even though 
it may not lead to anything better. “Moral man” fought for justice 
in the world, used as little violence as possible, and conscientiously 
humbled himself along the way. A moral man also should not shrink 
from responsibility. Th e responsible man should struggle for justice 
although nothing may come of it. A moral man had to work within 
the morally ambiguous power structures of society, developing and 
using countervailing power when necessary to bring about justice. 
Th is marked Niebuhr’s turn away from idealism, towards a more ide-
alistic realism – often termed “Christian realism” – the use of force 
and even violence if necessary in the battle for justice, striving to be 
democratic whenever possible, but non-democratic whenever neces-
sary. 7 Niebuhr’s ideas on humankind transferred easily to his views 
of international relations during the 1940s.
How did this all fi t into Niebuhr’s thoughts during the 1930s and 
1940s? Th e mid 1930s to the 1940s marked an increased preoccupa-
tion with international relations for Reinhold Niebuhr. As he devel-
oped his brand of idealistic realism that stemmed from events in both 
Europe and Asia in the 1930s, Niebuhr began to apply his view of 
humankind towards the international system. Not only did Niebuhr 
focus on theological issues which he applied to the realm of inter-
national politics in books such as Christianity and Power Politics, Th e 
Nature and Destiny of Man, and Th e Children of Light and the Children 
of Darkness, but he established two journals that dealt with Christian-
ity and international aff airs, Christianity and Crisis (1939) and Chris-
tianity and Society (1940). As an editor of both periodicals, Niebuhr’s 
ideas and arguments reached numerous subscribers, among them fel-
low Christians, government offi  cials, and the interested public. Th is 
prolifi c writing during the 1940s is a window into the development 
of Niebuhr’s thought on the transition from war to peace. 
Niebuhr’s idealistic realism/Christian realism became a tool 
through which to critique and resist fascism and shore up strug-
gling “bourgeois” democracies as stated in his work Christianity and 
Power Politics (1940). He wished to defend the relative justice of a 
bourgeois society against the “barbarians” in the international are-
na. When war began in Europe in 1939, Niebuhr called for all aid 
to the Allies short of war. He did not yet believe that the US should 
use violence or that it was American responsibility to be militari-
ly involved in the war. Violence, he believed, should be used only 
when it was necessary, yet he did not believe it so at that point. But 
at the same time, he said that war against Germany might be neces-
sary to help common civilization – meaning democratic Europe. He 
spoke out against staunch pacifi sts, saying that true Christian love 
was not the avoidance of war but responsibility towards others in 
need. Th erefore, American responsibility was to help the beleaguered 
“democratic” nations of Europe against the Axis.8
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Along with his own works, whether books or articles in his own 
journals or other national publications, Niebuhr also helped cre-
ate the Union for Democratic Action (UDA) to gain support of 
the non-communist left for President Franklin Roosevelt’s policies. 
Above all, Niebuhr hoped to fulfi ll American responsibility towards 
the British in particular. In 1941, the UDA lent support for Lend 
Lease and protection of Lend Lease shipping. Above all, the UDA 
promoted the idea that Americans owed something to common civ-
ilizations – in Niebuhr’s thinking, a moral commitment to liberate 
Europe from oppression. He began to promote the idea that Ameri-
cans must take responsibility for future world order.9
Niebuhr did not have to wait long for the United States to be-
come directly involved in Europe, and by the end of 1941, Niebuhr 
preoccupied himself with imagining the peace. Th ose who had supe-
rior power would have great responsibility and alone could enact the 
peace. Idealists were wrong in believing that the moral course was 
to surrender excess power and to seek equal participation by all in a 
world government. Balance of power realists also erred in believing in 
tossing out the idea of a world government and that the world would 
be better ordered with a perpetual standoff  between power blocs. 
Niebuhr suggested a middle ground between the idealists and realists 
– the Soviets, Americans, and British could share world leadership. 
Each of the three would limit each other as separate power blocs. 
Smaller nations would also be brought into the councils of the three. 
Th us realism would be tempered with a touch of Wilsonian idealism 
– big power responsibility would be balanced by small power rights. 
Separately idealism and realism would not work because “the ideal-
ists at their worst imagine that an ideal system of international law 
would solve the international problem….Th e realists understand that 
the organization of the world is, as every political problem, a ques-
tion of the manipulation of power.” Th erefore he believed that “If we 
are to have a decent peace, we must learn to combine the insights of 
the realists and the idealists. Th e problem is more diffi  cult than the 
idealists imagine. But it is not as insoluble as the realists claim.”10 As 
the war progressed, Niebuhr began to worry about the US and USSR 
being involved in the peace. As the two most powerful nations, he 
believed they had the responsibility to be involved in the world sys-
tem, but was afraid that they were adolescent and “unpredictable gi-
ants.” Th erefore the British as the mature and stable power would be 
the broker between the up and coming world powers.11
According to Niebuhr, two characteristics were necessary for a last-
ing peace. One was the creation of a durable world order, while the 
other was the development of justice (according to Niebuhr, the pos-
sibility of equality or mutual love amongst people, or in this instance, 
nations) within the new system. Order would come about through 
the organization and use of preponderant power by the great powers. 
Justice, on the other hand, would come about only if the great pow-
ers set up constitutional instruments to guarantee the weaker nations 
their just or equal rights. Niebuhr believed the prospect of achiev-
ing order was likely, but there was little prospect that justice would 
or could be achieved through constitutional arrangements because of 
the ideological diff erences between the West and the Soviets.12
However, the establishment of a workable world order was not 
as easy as Niebuhr had earlier described. As a wartime alliance, 
the United Nations was in early 1943, “little more than a concept 
and…not politically implemented.” In addition, Niebuhr contin-
ued, “a more stable world community is not possible if the lessons 
of the war are disregarded.” Th ose lessons were responsibility in the 
world and the necessity and possibility of common action among the 
great powers. To become a stable and powerful world community, 
the United Nations needed organization that kept in mind the les-
sons of war and could not be a mere balance of power or a federation 
of states, it needed to be somewhere in between. Th e United Na-
tions would keep each of the four powers in check – it would prevent 
an Anglo-American, Russian, or Chinese domination of the world 
community, but at the time being there was nothing within the sys-
tem that would bring justice to the weaker nations.13
Key to the development of a stable world order, according to 
Niebuhr, would be American use of power. First of all, Niebuhr 
was concerned with America’s aversion towards political or mili-
tary intervention on the international stage. Th e United States had 
to defi ne its responsibilities within the international community. He 
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warned, “if the impulse of isolationism should overwhelm this na-
tion the second time, we will become the chief instruments of world 
anarchy.” Th e United States needed to be steadfast in its internation-
al stance and embrace its responsibility as a great power.14 
America needed not only to use its power but use it responsibly – 
concerning itself with order and justice. Order would come through 
the organization of preponderant power among the great powers 
(of which the US would be one), because there was no other way of 
overcoming the anarchy of nationalist impulses. He believed justice 
could be achieved within this system if one of the great powers had 
the conscience and imagination to establish a constitutional system, 
which would protect weaker nations’ rights. American-style democra-
cy would be the best way to keep power in check and promote justice. 
Yet the problem arose over the nature of constitutional instruments, 
since American brand democracy would not be acceptable to all, par-
ticularly the Soviet Union. Because of this diff erence, there would 
be little chance of agreement over how the world would be ordered. 
Niebuhr was also concerned over both Russian territorial domina-
tion in Eastern Europe and American piosity.15 Niebuhr listed Rus-
sian policy as “the desire to establish Russian security and power” and 
American policy as “full of Christian and liberal universalism.”16
Because Soviet and American policies seemed incompatible, 
Niebuhr began to wonder whether an overall agreement on postwar 
policies between the wartime allies could happen. Th e question was, 
“what kind of comradeship [could] be established after the war [was] 
over?” To answer his own question, Niebuhr replied, “we share neither 
the fears of those who believe that there is no possibility of working 
out an accord between Russia and the western world, nor the hopes of 
those who think the diff erence between us and Russia is a very slight 
one and that historical forces will soon overcome it.” Realizing that 
throughout history nations of varying cultures learned to live togeth-
er, Niebuhr said that the Americans and Soviets had to come to terms 
with each other. America would have to deal with nations that were 
not democratic in order to establish a workable world order.17 
Th e postwar world would need order, yet there was little pros-
pect of a fully developed world system of constitutional order be-
cause not all nations would be willing to participate in a democrat-
ic system that would limit their power. Great powers, even those 
that were democratic, showed little inclination to delegate their 
authority to a world government. To Niebuhr, it appeared that a 
successful world system would be unlikely with “the inclination of 
Russia to seek security by territorial arrangements in the area con-
tiguous to it, and…the inclination of America to exploit its dom-
inant power, as the strongest industrial nation of the world, in an 
eff ort to win security by itself.”18 Th ere seemed to be little chance 
of agreement between the great powers.
Although he knew there was still much to overcome, Niebuhr 
became more optimistic in the chances for an agreement on post-
war policy between the United States and the Soviet Union after 
the October 1943 Moscow Conference. Looking back at the confer-
ence, Niebuhr related, “an agreement to discuss basic issues is how-
ever something of an achievement in itself, particularly consider-
ing the previous tensions between Russia and the western powers.” 
What became even more apparent after the conference was how the 
powers could organize the European continent so it would become 
neither an Anglo-American or Russian colony nor a mere tool in the 
combined politics of the great powers. To achieve a positive result, 
a European federation of some kind would be integral to the mu-
tual accord among the great powers of Britain, America, and Rus-
sia. Any federation would have to draw the nations of continental 
Europe into the overall agreement with the great powers that the 
British, Americans, and Soviets would hold the eff ective authority 
in world politics. It was obvious to Niebuhr that this would be a way 
to fulfi ll his earlier vision of great power responsibility in maintain-
ing world order balanced by small power rights. Th erefore the future 
world order would combine the insights of the realists with those 
of the idealists. He knew the answer to the problem was to “have 
more ‘constitutional’ features than a mere partnership between the 
big powers. What is called for is a synthesis between Woodrow Wil-
son’s approach and the piece-meal approach to world problems in 
which Churchill and Roosevelt seem to be engaged.” Th erefore pow-
er would be combined with democracy for a just world order.19 
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By 1944 Niebuhr was not quite a household name, but he was a 
growing presence in intellectual debate and a popular orator at col-
lege campuses across the nation especially after his book, Th e Chil-
dren of Light and Children of Darkness, which built upon his earlier 
work Th e Nature and Destiny of Man and his articles from the early 
1940s. In Th e Nature and Destiny of Man, Niebuhr looked at the par-
adoxical nature of man as sinner and as image of God which led him 
in Th e Children of Light and the Children of Darkness to see democra-
cy as a valuable political instrument. In his thinking, “Man’s capacity 
for justice makes democracy possible; but man’s inclination to injus-
tice makes democracy necessary.” He continued to argue that bour-
geois society had created democracy as a political tool, but had un-
derestimated the power of self-interest which would lead to injustice. 
Th us, democracy would be a necessary part of any future world order 
so as to promote a just peace.20 
Yet the future order would need more than just democracy to 
work. Niebuhr said there was much to learn from the fascists and 
Stalinists – “the children of light must be armed with the wisdom 
of the children of darkness but must remain free from their mal-
ice.” Th e children of darkness – the fascists and Stalinists had been 
more realistic in their view of human existence than the children 
of light. Th e children of light needed to adopt the children of dark-
ness’ shrewdness, while retaining their own moral purpose and open-
ness. He believed that the marketplace of ideas in an open society 
or democracy would discourage the self-interested. Democracy was 
built on men’s virtues while protecting against their vices – in other 
words, democracy acted as “checks and balances” between the good 
and evil within society. Reinhold thus was concerned about the ap-
parent injustice of the world at war. Niebuhr warns the “Children 
of Light” from believing that they possess superior virtue (Democ-
racy) to those against which they are arrayed. He believed that hu-
man beings needed to be realistic - willing to develop and use power, 
much like the “children of darkness,” in struggles to promote order 
and justice in the world system. Th erefore he believed American re-
sponsibility could include further violence or use of its power to se-
cure order and justice for the world system. Democracy alone could 
not secure world order. Both Democracy and power would be neces-
sary for a just world order.21 
 When the war ended in Europe in spring 1945, Niebuhr con-
tinued his outpouring of ideas on world order. After the San Fran-
cisco Conference (April-June 1945), Niebuhr was pleased with the 
improved character of the United Nations. Th e character of the UN 
improved since the small nations made themselves heard, gained 
considerable rights, and because general public discussion brought a 
greater degree of moral idealism into the charter. Yet under the sur-
face of the UN charter, the political realities gave little assurance for 
Niebuhr. He believed that the conference “was unable to solve the 
main problem which confronted it, which was the establishment of 
a genuinely mutual accord between Russia and the west.” Th e fi nal 
outcome of the conference was that a system of world security exist-
ed on paper but did not hide the fact that the each of the great pow-
ers controlled a part of the world under their “sphere of infl uence.” 
Niebuhr believed, “none of the great powers are quite certain that 
one of the other powers may not poach in the preserves assigned to 
the other.” Th erefore after the conference, at issue was lack of trust 
between the Soviets and Americans. Without trust between the two 
major powers, the UN as a world government would be a failure.22 
Such mistrust soon manifested itself in Niebuhr’s thoughts. By 
1946, Niebuhr’s contacts in Germany insisted that the Soviets were 
engaged in a systematic eff ort to impose a Communist regime in 
Germany and in the nations of Eastern Europe, and came with 
a more dismal view of the Soviets. He began to fear Stalinism as 
much as Nazism. He wondered,
What shall we think of Russia? Is this totalitarianism just 
like Nazism? Is Russia bent upon expansion and aggression 
just like fascism? In answering such questions we must ad-
mit that Russian authitarianism has similarities with any 
other form of authoritarianism. Th e lack of freedom in Rus-
sia makes it impossible for instance to establish any direct 
contact with the common people of Russia and to achieve 
a community of mutual trust between them and us, without 
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which all constitutional provisions for peace are vain. Fur-
thermore the lack of democratic procedures will make the 
Russian domination of Eastern Europe so vexatious that all 
sorts of unrest must be expected. But this [unrest] will not 
lead to democracy; because the more unpopular the Rus-
sians make themselves, the less will they be able to allow 
criticism against their rule to be expressed.23 
Because of Russian domination in Eastern Europe, democracy 
would be unlikely to fl ourish. For this reason, the United Nations 
could serve only as a bridge between the Western world and the 
Soviet Union and its satellites. In Niebuhr’s eyes, the UN would 
not be a successful world government. 
Niebuhr did believe that the USSR had rights to security inter-
ests and control in Eastern Europe, however the Russians would 
not be satisfi ed with a defensive system in Eastern Europe but 
wanted control of Europe. Th ey would do so by scaring the West 
with threats of war and thus receive concessions. Niebuhr believed 
that the way to avoid war that could ensue from Russian threats, 
was not to fear it, but at the same to time to be patient. “Under 
these circumstances, a policy of yielding would run the risk of re-
sulting in the same consequences which fl owed from Mr. Cham-
berlain’s ill-fated diplomacy. But it must be emphasized that pa-
tience is as necessary as fi rmness. We must continue to bargain 
with the Russians.”24 A way that fi rmness and patience could be 
combined would be through massive economic aid to Europe.25 
In following his thinking on massive economic aid to Europe, 
Niebuhr supported President Harry Truman’s appeal to Congress for 
$400 million in emergency military and economic aid to Greece and 
Turkey. He said that Soviet Communism threatened both “democra-
cies.” It was the United States’ responsibility to aid these beleaguered 
democracies. He was a strong supporter since he kept in contact 
with many of his European associates which gave him a clearer (or 
possibly biased) view of the situation. He believed American moves 
were absolutely necessary, although these countries could not real-
ly be called democracies. Th ese countries were not at stake, but the 
peace in Europe was. According to Niebuhr, the move to aid these 
countries was of symbolic signifi cance – Americans taking respon-
sibility to bring order and justice to Europe. If it helped bolster the 
fi ght between more democratic sections within Western European 
nations against their own communist groups, then he was for it. He 
believed that the Russian threat was political rather than military — 
namely the creation of Soviet satellites in Western Europe. Niebuhr 
held similar ideas to Secretary of State George Marshall and sup-
ported the Marshall plan. He believed, “Europe is in dire economic 
straits and cannot possibly get on its feet unaided. We cannot avoid 
the spread of either economic chaos or of political totalitarianism or 
of both (the later being the fruit of the former) if we do not come to 
the aid of a European economy which is threatened by complete col-
lapse.” Th e way to proceed against the Russian political threat was 
to make sure that the European economy was not weakened enough 
for European citizens to turn towards communism.26
Niebuhr continued to believe that the constitutional world sys-
tem of the newly chartered United Nations may not work as in-
tended because of the atomic bomb and because of world plurality 
or the diff erences between the “democracies” and the Soviets. “Th e 
bomb” issue engulfed nations in the hysteria of fear that the world 
would “stumble into an atomic war and mutual destruction.” Above 
all, the American monopoly on the destructive force aggravated the 
already great mistrust between the two powers. Mistrust also de-
veloped because not all had the same democracy as the US. Great 
powers would not be ready to submit to world authority – did not 
want to give up their power to an international body based upon 
democratic ideals. Above all the Soviets were not a democracy, but 
a dictatorship. He saw that, “no better solution than the division of 
Europe into spheres of infl uence seems to have been arrived at.”27 
In other words, the continent was now “divided” between the west 
and the Soviet Union – the UN, as it stood – was a farce.
Niebuhr’s beliefs were echoed by some British. “Th ey would main-
tain the UN as a bridge with Russia, but they believe that if Russia 
refuses to cooperate in an international [system], the United Nations 
can serve only very minimal ends.” However, there was minimal hope 
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that if the Western world remained fi rm and patient, it would be 
possible to change Russian attitudes. According to Niebuhr’s “strat-
egy of patience,” one way to bring this about would be to “stop fu-
tile eff orts to change what cannot be changed in Eastern Europe, 
regarded by Russia as its strategic security belt.” Th e other related 
aspect of this strategy was to realize, “that, while further encroach-
ments of Russia in Western Europe…might mean war, it is also ap-
parent that the eff ort to keep Russian power in bounds must not be 
primarily military. Th e way to save Western Europe is to give it a 
sound economic basis for a sound political life.” Th erefore Niebuhr 
continued to espouse not only democratic means but the use of pow-
er in maintaining order in Europe.28 
In the end, Niebuhr believed that the UN, “does not have the 
power to establish a stable world order. But it is an important cen-
ter for the meeting of minds.”29 To Niebuhr, world order was not 
a hopeless venture because the UN had failed to establish a stable 
global system. He spoke out against those he labeled idealists, say-
ing, “they have wearied us with their constant reiteration that we will 
have no civilization at all if we do not achieve a genuine world or-
der.” According to the idealists, the world would not avoid mutual 
annihilation unless a successful world government that could bring 
all nations under its domination and substitute the system of mutu-
al fear with mutual security. To Niebuhr, the idealists slogan of “one 
world or none” was a “foolish slogan” because of “the present impos-
sibility achieving world government.” Likewise he said that the pol-
iticians who “are trying to preserve some minimal contact with Rus-
sia even while they resist Russian encroachments on the continent 
are not as logical as the idealists….But their wisdom, however lowly 
and pragmatic, is a better guide out of our chaos, than the wisdom of 
the idealist.” His advice was that the United States should not give 
in to despair, but to responsibly remain both fi rm and patient in the 
quest for order and justice in a postwar world, in which there was no 
clear road to security or peace.30 
In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty appeared to be a radical de-
parture in American foreign policy, yet Niebuhr proclaimed it the 
“logical capstone of a policy which has been developing ever since 
we emerged from the second (sic) World War as the world’s most 
powerful nation.” Specifi cally it brought two elements to logi-
cal conclusion. Th e fi rst one was that the United States now had a 
new sense of responsibility in the world community. It also spelled 
out the American nation’s special responsibility to the North At-
lantic community, western civilization, or the “democratic world.” 
Th e North Atlantic pact was necessary because, “the present real-
ity is that the United Nations presupposes the unanimity of the 
great powers, which does not in fact exist. Th is great organization 
has therefore been reduced to the status of a minimal bridge be-
tween East and West.” Although such a function was important, it 
was not the original intention of the UN. To Niebuhr, the peace of 
the world depended upon the maintenance of preponderant pow-
er in the West. Th e pact was necessary because the Western Euro-
pean nations desired it. Th e Atlantic treaty was partly designed to 
quiet the fear of Soviet occupation of the continent and to prove to 
Europe that the United States would do what was necessary to in-
crease their capacity to resist occupation, much as had been done 
with the Marshall Plan. Again, the United States had a responsi-
bility, in this case to the “democratic world,” to promote order and 
justice in the world. Th e North Atlantic Pact was the way that the 
United States could combine power and democratic means to car-
ry out its responsibility. 31 
Yet Niebuhr continued to worry whether it was advisable to orga-
nize the west too tightly. At issue was the fragile nature of the min-
imal bridge between the West and the Soviet Union in the United 
Nations. Niebuhr stated, “our recent success with the Berlin airlift 
proves how important it is to remain in a bargaining position with 
the Russians. Th e prophets who predicted that our fi rmness in re-
gard to Berlin would inevitably end in a shooting war, have been re-
futed by events. We can still bargain with Russia.” Had the Unit-
ed States not remained fi rm or patient they would have lost their 
chance to negotiate with the Soviets.32 Although Niebuhr did not 
create a world system, he explained why the United Nations failed 
as a workable system and why NATO worked as a stable order that 
could promote justice for its membership.
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 In conclusion, Reinhold Niebuhr developed an intriguing view of 
the international system in the 1940s. His views were that American 
responsibility was to uphold world order to defend and promote jus-
tice. In order to do this, the United States had to take advice from 
both realists and idealists to form a new outlook towards establish-
ing a global system by balancing democracy with the use of power. 
Th e 1940s was the test for his emerging theory.
Although Niebuhr envisioned an interesting world view, he was 
not the architect of American grand strategy in the 1940s. As one of 
the most famous Protestant thinkers of the twentieth century Amer-
ica, Reinhold lived his life in the spotlight, unlike many scholars and 
preachers. Th ousands discussed and were infl uenced by his nationwide 
lectures and prolifi c scholarship. Because of his notoriety, government 
policymakers, political fi gures, and other national leaders sought 
Niebuhr’s guidance. From 1946 on, he had been a member of Coun-
cil of Foreign Relations and met regularly with the State Depart-
ment’s Advisory Commission on Cultural Policy in Occupied Terri-
tories. He was also invited to join in deliberations of George Kennan’s 
Policy Planning Staff  in June 1949 for two days. Yet he did not have a 
notable impact upon American policy-making in the 1940s.
Although Niebuhr did not create world order, his contribution 
was that he explained why the United Nations failed as a workable 
system in the 1940s and why NATO worked as a stable commu-
nity that promoted justice for its membership. He therefore made 
suggestions for future reference. By the end of the decade, Niebuhr 
saw the failures of the United Nations as a stable world order that 
would be able to bring about a just peace. According to Niebuhr, 
any successful world order would combine the insights of the real-
ists with that of the idealists. Th is meant that the United Nations 
would need order based upon preponderant power shared among 
the great powers. Th is did not happen because of the failures of 
the Western great powers and the Soviet Union to share world 
power as ideological diff erences developed into mistrust between 
the former Allies. Although the United Nations was able to bring 
weaker powers into the councils of the great powers, the stronger 
nations could not guarantee just rights to the smaller nations. In 
the end, the United Nations served as a minimal bridge between 
the East and the West. Although this was a good development, it 
was not the intended purpose for the UN. 
For Niebuhr, American responsibility transferred to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. Th e United States would be the great 
power that would guarantee the Western Europeans their just rights 
in the world system. American power would be combined with a 
democratic system to create a workable world order. Th e alliance 
with the Europeans was workable because of a moral consensus – 
these nations were “democratic” so it was much easier to come to 
an agreement for this reason. NATO would create peace by remain-
ing fi rm and patient towards the Soviet Union. Th e United Nations 
would only be the way through which the Soviet Union and the 
West could negotiate with each other, while NATO would be the 
stable order that would help prevent another war.
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